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Abstract  
We examine the relationship between corporate lobbying, shareholder-based 
litigation outcomes, and firm value for financial firms. First, we show that political 
lobbying lowers the litigation likelihood for financial institutions. Secondly, 
lobbying firms experience a higher likelihood of having litigation dismissed, and the 
average settlement amount is significantly lower for lobbying institutions. In 
addition, shortly after a litigation announcement, lobbying firms experience 
significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), compared to non-lobbying 
firms. Finally, we show that lobbying firms have higher long-run buy-and-hold 
abnormal stock returns (BHARs) following lobbying activities. Our results link 
financial institution lobbying activity with improved legal outcomes and increases 
in firm value, implying that lobbying may protect financial institutions from 
reduced firm value through the building of political capital and reducing litigation 
costs. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we focus on financial firm lobbying, which is a firm-level action meant 
to influence government officials or politicians in order to alter policy proposals in a 
manner that benefits the firm. Many corporations engage in political lobbying in 
order to build political capital and seek political gain from their lobbying 
expenditures, which may ultimately increase shareholder wealth (Goldman et al., 
2009; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Gupta and Swenson, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 
2005; Claessens, et al., 2008; Boubakri et al., 2012; Hill et al,. 2013; Faccio, 2006; 
Niessen and Ruenzi, 2009, Cooper et al., 2010; Blau et al., 2013; Kroszner and 
Stratmann, 1998; Stratmann, 1995; and Chen et al., 2014). For example, in 2012, 
both public and private organizations spent approximately $3.30 billion on lobbying 
efforts1. While individual donations are limited to $5,000 per candidate per election 
cycle, there is no restriction on the amount firms can spend on lobbying2. Therefore, 
firm lobbying expenditures can be substantially greater than individual campaign 
donations and have recently been measured in the billions of dollars for recent 
elections (Kerr et al., 2011, Hill et al., 2013).  
The potential benefits of corporate lobbying on shareholder value are quantified in 
the literature (Mathur et al., 2013; Borghesi and Chang, 2012; among others). 
Additionally, Agrawal and Knoeber (2000) show that the impact of corporate 
lobbying is more pronounced in heavily regulated industries. In an extension of this 
line of literature, we focus on the financial industry and examine the potential 
benefit of corporate lobbying in terms of shareholder class action litigation 
outcomes. We utilize firm-level data on both corporate lobbying expenditures and 
collect a sample of 131 shareholder class action lawsuits for the largest 200 
financial firms from 2000 to 2013. We examine the impact of corporate lobbying 
activities on litigation outcomes to determine whether the lobbying activities appear 
to alter the political and legal environment in favor of the firms. Then, we analyze 
the relationship between financial firm lobbying and firm value. Finally, we link 
firm lobbying activities, litigation outcomes, and firm value. 
                                                            
1 http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ 
2 http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml 
Using logistic and panel data estimation methodologies, our results show that 
financial firms that engage in lobbying activities face a lower likelihood of 
shareholder lawsuits and a lower number of total lawsuits. In addition, lobbying 
firm lawsuit outcomes are better than those of non-lobbying firms. Lawsuits filed 
against lobbying financial institutions are more likely to be dismissed, are settled 
for lower amounts, and are shorter in duration than those of non-lobbying firms, 
consistent with the benefits gained from corporate lobbying.  
In addition, we examine the short-term effect of firm lobbying on firm value by 
conducting an event study surrounding litigation announcement days. We compute 
cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) around several event intervals and find 
that lobbying financial institutions have significantly higher event interval CARs. 
We also test the relationship between lobbying activities and long-term firm value 
by computing buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns (BHARs) for 12, 24, and 36 
month holding periods following lobbying activities. Results show that lobbying 
activities are associated with higher long-term stock returns in the form of BHARs. 
Finally, we analyze the interaction of shareholder lawsuits and lobbying activity in 
order to more closely link increases in firm value with improved legal outcomes due 
to lobbying activities. Results show that shareholder lawsuits are associated with 
significant declines in BHARs; however, financial firms that are exposed to 
lawsuits, but are also lobbyists, experience no significant change in BHARs, 
consistent with the improved shareholder value attributed to the improved legal 
outcomes gained through lobbying. 
For final investigation, we test the effect of lawsuit on corporate cash holding levels. 
Arena and Julio (2015) find that shareholder allegations increase the cash holding 
for future anticipated settlements. We test the similar hypothesis and find that 
lawsuits increase cash holding (including net cash holding) in our sample. However, 
our analysis show that lobbying financial institutions have no changes in their cash 
holding levels. This may be due to the fact that lobbying firms are not affected by 
settlement amounts resulting from shareholding allegations. To test the effect of 
cash holding, we document that stock performance of lobbying firms are not 
influenced by the changes in cash holdings. In this case, our study shows that 
lobbying firm may benefit from the lower settlements amounts resulting from policy 
proposal changes. 
Our work highlights the potential implications of, and benefits from, lobbying, 
where lobbying financial institutions face improved outcomes from class action 
lawsuits, due to increased political capital and influence. Our research is similar to 
Yu and Yu (2012) and Hill et al. (2013), who analyze the value of lobbying; however, 
our study is unique in analyzing the influence of corporate lobbying on lawsuit 
outcomes and firm performance in both the short and long-run. Departing from 
some other major empirical findings regarding the link between lobbying and firm 
performance, we conclude that lobbying can increase shareholder wealth for the 
financial industry by improving the firm’s legal outcomes.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the literature on the 
benefits of corporate lobbying. The testing methodologies and hypotheses are 
outlined in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 examines the effect of 
lobbying activities on litigation likelihood and outcomes, while Section 6 examines 
the relationship between lobbying and firm value. Section 7 provides robustness, 
and Section 8 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Previous literature documents the substantial benefits of firm political involvement 
at both the CEO and firm levels. For example, empirical studies show that firms 
may experience higher excess returns when they sponsor bills in U.S. legislative 
bodies, due to the political capital gained through the lobbying process (Mathur et 
al., 2013; Borghesi and Chang, 2012). 
Lobbying specifically targets the legislative acts that can influence firm 
performance. For instance, lobbying may provide tax policy benefits, which would 
ultimately change firm revenue, sales, and expenditures (Richter et al., 2009). 
Similarly, lobbying may influence visa and trade policy (Kerr et al., 2011), prevent 
corporate fraud detection (Yu and Yu, 2012), provide greater success in securing 
bailout assistance, and influence political decisions (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012). 
Furthermore, the impact of lobbying may decrease taxes on firm repatriated 
earnings (Alexander et al., 2009), lower effective corporate tax rates (Richter et al.; 
2009), and increase the likelihood to receive more TARP (Trouble Asset Relief 
Program) funds (Blau et al., 2013). All of these effects may result in increased cash 
flows, or reductions in risk, for the lobbying firm, which will increase the value of 
the firm.  
Our study extends the literature pertaining to the impact of corporate lobbying on 
firm value in the face of shareholder-based lawsuits, because these lawsuits are 
more likely to be dismissed, or settled for lower amounts when the firm lobbies for 
favorable legislation, or gains some other form of political influence. Shareholder-
based lawsuits or corporate fraud has been investigated at the firm level previously. 
Fraud may be related to CEO equity compensation (Burns and Kedia, 2006), or the 
firm having a lack of board independence (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). While better 
monitoring is effective in detecting corporate fraud (Dyck et al., 2009), our study 
contributes to the literature by suggesting that lobbying may be another factor in 
corporate fraud detection and may influence the outcome of fraud investigations. 
While lobbying is positively related to accounting measures of firm performance 
(Chen et al., 2014), it may also serve to increase the market value of the firm (Hill 
et al., 2013) and promote accounting conservatism (Kong et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
the impact of corporate lobbying is shown to be more pronounced for firms operating 
in heavily regulated industries (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2000). Firms are found to 
have doubled their lobbying expenditures between 1999 and 2006, once they 
recognized the effectiveness of lobbying (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012). Subsequently, 
firms may increase their lobbying expenditure if the political geography shifts to an 
area that is not closely affiliated with the President (Antia et al., 2013).  
The literature points to the benefit gained from the political actions achieved from 
firms spending their resources on lobbying efforts and accessing favor from the 
American political system (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2013). Hence, political 
spending may provide well- established access to politicians for firms (Kroszner and 
Stratmann, 1998). Political spending may lower the agency cost of free cash flow 
(Kim et al., 2013), yield better stock performance (Jayachandran, 2006); Fan, Wong, 
and Zhang, 2007; Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang, 2009; Goldman et al., 2009; and 
Goldman et al., 2013), or elicit a positive market reaction when the supported 
candidate is elected (Cooper et al., 2010). We extend the literature along this line by 
examining the relationship between financial firm lobbying, improved shareholder 
lawsuit outcomes, and firm value. 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Litigation, Lobbying, and Firm Performance 
Our main goal in this study is to determine whether financial firm corporate 
lobbying protects shareholder wealth by influencing the outcome of lawsuits. 
Securities class actions is common in U.S. market, and there have been many cases 
of firms being subjected to litigation involving: accounting irregularities; insider 
trading; broker-market manipulation; disclosure failure; broker practices; 
misrepresentation; and stock-price manipulation. Accordingly, we investigate 
whether lobbying financial institutions, which lobby bills in U.S. legislative bodies, 
are less likely to be involved in securities class actions, since they influence the 
legal and political environment through lobbying activities.   
In examining the impact of lobbying in empirical models, several lobbying 
indicators are the main explanatory variables. We create three separate lobbying 
indicators. Lobbydum is a binary variable equal to one if firm lobbies at least one 
bill, zero otherwise. Our second variable is Ln(LobbyExpense), and it is calculated as 
the total lobbying expenditure (log transformed) spent by a financial firm in a given 
year. Our third variable is Ln(TotalBills), which is the total number of bills 
sponsored (log transformed) by the lobbying financial firms.  
We develop several hypotheses intended to uncover the relationship between 
lobbying and firm value in our empirical tests. 
Hypotheses 1 (H.1): All other things equal, lobbying lowers the likelihood of being 
subjected to class action lawsuits (𝛽𝛽1<0). 
We test H.1 in an empirical model of the form: 
 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠=2
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (1) 
Where 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a binary variable equal to one if the firm i is facing a securities 
class litigation in following year, t+1. Lobbying indicators are a) whether firm is 
lobbyist, b) the total lobbying expenditure and, c) the total number of bills lobbied. 
Controls include firm-specific variables, such as firm size, financial leverage, asset 
tangibility, Tobin’s Q, sales growth, Herfindahl Index, and firm age. We run logistic 
regressions and report that lobbyist firms are less likely to be subjected to litigation. 
Hypothesis 2 (H.2): All other things equal, lobbying lowers the number of class 
action lawsuits (𝛽𝛽1<0). 
We test H.2 in an empirical model of the form: 
 ln (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠=2
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (2) 
where the dependent variable is log transformation of total number of class actions 
lawsuits for firm i in given year. We use same set of lobbying indicators and control 
variables to how lobbying efforts impacts the number of lawsuits against the firm.  
Hypothesis 3 (H.3): All other things equal, lobbying influences litigation outcomes.  
We test H.3 in an empirical model of the form: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠=2
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (3) 
where the dependent variable CaseOutcome is associated with the outcome of the 
litigation. We hand collect data on 131 cases and report case outcome in two ways: 
a) dismiss is equal to one if the case is dismissed by court, and zero otherwise; and 
b) settle is equal to one if both parties agree to settle the case, zero otherwise. H.3 
tests whether corporate lobbying influences case outcomes for financial firms. Since 
Yu and Yu (2012) document that lobbying benefits corporations by deferring further 
investigation by officials, we hypothesize that lobbying financial firms may also 
built political capital that would alter case results.  
Hypothesis 4 (H.4): All other things equal, lobbying influences case 
characteristics.  
We test H.4 in an empirical model of the form: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠=2
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (4) 
where CaseCharacteristics are other case outcomes, measured as a) the total 
settlement amount (log transformed) and b) total duration (log transformed) of the 
litigation, measured by the difference between the announcement date and the 
closure date. H.4 investigates the effect of lobbying, not only on the likelihood of 
litigation, but also on other characteristics of cases.  
Hypothesis 5 (H.5): All other things equal, securities class action lawsuit 
announcements effect firm performance in terms of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR).  
To measure the market reaction of a litigation announcement, we employ an event 
study methodology, based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is 
the daily stock return for firm i, 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 is the risk free return, and 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 is the return of 
the CRSP Value Weight index). 
 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑀𝑀�𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (5) 
We utilize different event windows surrounding the litigation announcement dates, 
CAR[-t, +t], and the null hypothesis is that the cumulative litigation event 
cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero, 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜:𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 = 0. We compare cumulative 
abnormal returns for lobbying, compared to non-lobbying financial firms and report 
the differences as the impact of lobbying on the litigation announcement effect on 
firm value.  
Hypothesis 6 (H.6): All other things equal, lobbying affects firm performance in 
terms of buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) (𝛽𝛽1>0). 
We test H.6 in an empirical model of the form: 
 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑠𝑠=2
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (6) 
We measure firm performance in two ways. First, we identify the impact of 
shareholder litigation on firm performance. Then, we analyze whether lobbying 
improves firm value. We calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for 
t+12, t+24, t+36 months after the lobbying activity.  
We conduct three sets of tests to measure the influence of lobbying on financial firm 
performance. First, we regress BHAR on firm-level lobbying indicators in order to 
show whether lobbying increases shareholder wealth. Then, we regress BHAR on an 
interaction term, multiplying lobbying by litigation, which is equal to one if a firm is 
both lobbying and is subject to shareholder litigation, zero otherwise. In this case, 
we discuss the effect of lobbying on performance when the firm is facing 
simultaneous litigation. Our main interest is in the sign and magnitude of the 
interaction term. An insignificant coefficient of the interaction term indicates that 
lobbying firms that are also facing lawsuits have no difference in BHARs for up to 
three years.  Lastly, we split our sample between lobbying and non-lobbying firms 
and measure the effect of lobbying, not only visually, but also statistically, testing 
two coefficients from two separate regressions. We estimate the model by running a 
fixed effect, panel regression3.  
3.2 Robustness Check 
For a robustness check, we conduct propensity score matching to identify if lobbying 
firms have more dismissals, less settlements, lower settlement amounts, and faster 
litigation. To more convincingly link lobbying to case outcomes, we construct a 
matched sample of firms that differ by their lobbying status, but otherwise exhibit 
the same observable firm characteristics. For propensity score matching, we split 
our sample into two groups, a treatment group, which includes lobbying firms, and 
control group that includes non-lobbying firms.  
4. Data Description  
4.1 Firm Data 
We utilize the COMPUSTAT database to identify the publicly traded financial firms 
used in our study. We gather our sample from the Fama-French 12 industry 
classification, Industry 11: Financial firms. In each year, we select the top 200 
financial institutions, based on annual market capitalization at the end of each year 
from 2000 to 2013. We limit our empirical analyses to large companies, because 
they are able to lobby and are more incentivized to lobby in order to realize the 
benefit on their substantial lobbying expenditure. We find that 25 percent of the 
financial firms in our study is defined as a lobbying firms, while 2 percent of the 
excluded firms are considered lobbying from COMPUSTAT sample of financial 
                                                            
3 Std. Errors are clustered for robustness check at firm level.  
institutions. It is clear that lobbying is concentrated amongst the largest financial 
institutions, which have resources to influence legislative processes.  
Our sample includes 200 unique firms for a total of 2,579 firm-year observations 
between 2000 and 2013. To measure firm performance, control variables are 
gathered from COMPUSTAT and the Center for Research Security Prices (CRSP) 
databases. Firm-specific controls include variables, such as firm size, financial 
leverage, asset tangibility, Tobin’s Q, sales growth, Herfindahl Index, and firm age. 
4.2 Event Study 
We utilize the Center for Research Security Prices (CRSP) database and collect the 
daily stock returns for use in generating litigation announcement abnormal returns 
in our event study. In addition, the CRSP Value Weighted Market index is used as 
the benchmark market return for computing event abnormal returns in our event 
study. Finally, we utilize the CRSP monthly stock returns to compute buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) for t+12, t+24 and t+36 month post-litigation horizons to 
measure long run financial stock performance. 
4.3 Litigation Data 
We gather our security action lawsuit data from the Stanford Law School webpage. 
We hand collect 131 cases, their outcomes, conclusions, durations and settlement 
amounts4.  
 
4.4 Lobbying Information 
We collect lobbying information from Congressional Bills Project database5 to track 
the lobbied bills that are sponsored in both the U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives.  
                                                            
4 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings 
5 http://www.congressionalbills.org/ 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for our sample at the lobbyist firm level. As 
shown in Panel A, over the 11-year span of our sample period, the average lobbying 
expenditure is more than 315,000 USD. In addition, 13 percent of the firms in our 
sample are defined as lobbyist, and the average firm lobbies 2.52 bills in either the 
U.S. House of Representatives, or Senate. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel B of Table 1 represents lawsuit characteristics at the firm level. On average, 
4 percent of the firms in our sample are subject to shareholder class actions, while 
the dismissal and settlement ratios are both approximately 2 percent. On average, 
firms pay more than 800,000 USD for each case settlement, and the average 
duration of litigation in our sample is 26 days from announcement to conclusion. In 
addition, Figure 1 represents the number of class actions over the sample period of 
our data, and we observe the that the 2008 Financial Crises has a serious impact on 
shareholder lawsuits for financial firms, as the number of actions climbs to 36 cases 
in 2008. 
[Insert Figure 1 here]  
Finally, Panel C of Table 1 shows the firm characteristics of our sample. The 
average firm in our sample has total assets of approximately 1 billion USD, is 17.3 
years old, has book leverage of approximately 30 percent, and a return on assets of 
3 percent.  
5. Lobbying and Shareholder Lawsuits 
In Hypotheses H.1 to H.4, we examine relationship between corporate political 
lobbying and the likelihood and outcomes of shareholder litigation actions in order 
to quantify the potential benefits of corporate lobbying. We first examine the link 
between lobbying and legal outcomes by testing Hypothesis H.1 by estimating 
Equation (1) using a logistic estimation methodology; the results are presented in 
Table 2. The  dependent variable in Equation (1), Lawsuit, is equal to one if a firm 
is subject to shareholder lawsuits, and zero otherwise.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 shows that lobbying financial firms are less likely to be subject shareholder 
allegations, as the coefficient Lobbydum, representing whether or not a firm 
actively lobbied, is negative and significant at the one percent level. Similarly, 
increases in total lobbying expenditures lowers the likelihood of shareholder 
litigation, as the coefficient Ln(LobbyExpense), representing the dollar amount 
spent on corporate lobbying, is negative and significant at the one percent level. 
Finally, the coefficient Ln(totalBills), which is the number of bills lobbied is 
negative and significant at the one percent level, indicating that firms that are more 
active in lobbying experience a lower likelihood of lawsuits. These findings are 
similar to Yu and Yu (2012) who find that lobbying firms are less likely to be caught 
in corporate scandals.  
In addition to the lobbying activity variables, several important control variables 
are significant across the specifications of Equation (1). For example, the coefficient 
for the log of firm assets is positive and significant at the one percent level across 
the specifications of Table 2, indicating that larger financial firms are more likely to 
be sued – an intuitive result. In addition, there is some evidence (significance at the 
10 percent level) that high-growth financial institutions, as measured by Tobin’s Q, 
are more likely to be subject to litigation.  In addition, a positive and significant 
coefficient for the Herfindahl Index indicates that financial institutions that exist in 
less competitive industries are more likely to be subject to shareholder lawsuits. 
Finally, a negative and significant coefficient for BookLeaverage implies that more 
highly leveraged financial institutions are less likely to be subject to shareholder 
litigation, a result that is consistent with prior research supporting leverage as a 
mechanism to control agency costs (Ang, et al.,2000; Harvey, et al., 2004; among 
others)   
Next, we continue to examine the relationship between corporate lobbying and 
shareholder litigation by testing Hypothesis H.2 by estimating Equation (2); results 
are presented in Table 3. The dependent variable in Table 3, ln(Lawsuit), is the log 
transform of the number of lawsuits that a firm faces in a given year. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Consistent with the results reported in Table 2, we find that increases in lobbying 
activity lowers the number of shareholder class action lawsuits on average. We find 
that lobbying firms experience a lower number of lawsuits, and increases in 
lobbying spending similarly reduces the number of lawsuits in our data. In addition, 
the greater the number of bills lobbied by a financial institution, the lower the 
number of lawsuits. Finally, consistent with prior results, larger financial 
institutions tend to be subject to more frequent shareholder lawsuits, as ln(Assets) 
is positive and significant across specifications. 
As a final analysis of the relationship between corporate lobbying activities and 
firm legal outcomes, we test Hypothesis H.4 by estimating Equation (4); results are 
presented in Tables 4 and 5. In Table 4, we focus on the relationship between 
lobbying and case outcomes and utilize two dependent variables. In specifications 
(1) – (3), the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the case is 
dismissed after initial hearings, and zero otherwise. In specifications (4) – (6), the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the case is settled, and zero 
otherwise.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4, specifications (1) – (3) report that financial institutions which lobby, spend 
more on lobbying, and lobby a larger number of legislation, are more likely to have 
their cases dismissed; Increases in our lobbying indicators increases the likelihood 
that cases will be dismissed. In a related result, specifications (4) – (6) of Table 4 
show that firms engaged in more active lobbying are less likely to settle shareholder 
lawsuits. Our results coincide with and provide evidence showing the potential 
benefits of lobbying, where the lobbying firms obtain more favorable legal outcomes, 
which may reduce legal costs. Since firms spend excess amount on lobbying, an 
additional settlement amount is lowered by political connections, in terms of 
lobbying. 
In Table 5, we examine the relationship between financial firm corporate lobbying 
and case characteristics. The dependent variable Ln(Settle Amount) in specifications 
(1) – (3) for Table 5 is the log transform of the dollar settlement amount of 
shareholder lawsuits, and the variable ln(Duration) is the log transform of the 
length of the trial, measured in days. Therefore, Table 5 estimates the impact of 
firm lobbying on case characteristics, such as the amount spent on legal settlements 
and the length of costly legal proceedings.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Specifications (1) – (3) report that, on average, lobbying lowers the expected legal 
settlement amount, as all three lobbying variables are negatively associated with 
legal settlement amount and are significant at the one percent level. This results 
implies that lobbying expenditures may be offset by the reduced settlements they 
provide, as well as other potential benefits.  
Moreover, specifications (4) – (6) of Table 5 show that lobbying significantly reduces 
the total duration of the cases. The dependent variable Ln(Duration) is the total 
number of days between the announcement of litigation and the closure of the case. 
We find that financial firm lobbying reduces the number of days during litigation, 
where cases are solved at faster rates, thus potentially reducing uncertainty and 
litigation costs.   
The results presented in Tables 2 – 5 show that financial firm corporate lobbying is 
associated with better legal outcomes in regards to shareholder class action 
lawsuits. Corporate lobbying activity is shown to reduce the likelihood of 
shareholder lawsuits, reduce the number of shareholder lawsuits, increase the 
likelihood that lawsuits will be dismissed, and reduce both the expected settlement 
amount and the duration of shareholder lawsuits. Our results may reveal that 
lobbying may yield financial firms legal benefits, since the goal of lobbying is to 
change policy proposals that would benefit the firms.   
6. Lobbying and Financial Firm Value 
In the previous section, we show evidence supporting that financial firm corporate 
lobbying yields financial benefits to the firm in the form of decreased expected legal 
costs. However, lobbying firms spend upwards of millions of dollars on corporate 
lobbying, and it is unclear as to whether the legal benefits of lobbying offset their 
costs and result in improved shareholder value.  Therefore, in this section, we 
investigate the important question as to whether the benefits of corporate political 
lobbying results in improved value for lobbying firms.  
In our first analysis of the impact of financial firm lobbying activity on measures of 
shareholder wealth, we test Hypothesis H.5 by conducting an event study of the 
stock price reaction to the announcement of shareholder litigation for lobbying, 
compared to non-lobbying firms. We collect the announcement dates for the 
shareholder litigation announcements of 131 firms and employ a traditional event 
study methodology. We use the CRSP value weighted index and the CAPM to 
calculate firm cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the three-day period 
surround the event announcements. We divide the sample into firms that engage in 
lobbying and firms that do not and test for significant differences in the CARs. 
Results reporting the differences in litigation announcement CARs between 
lobbying and non-lobbying firms are presented in Table 6 for several event 
estimation windows. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Columns 3 and 5 of Table 6 show the estimated CARs over seven event windows 
surrounding litigation announcement days for lobbying firms and non-lobbying 
firms, respectively. The CARs are negative for all financial firms and all event 
windows, which is consistent with a negative reaction of investors to shareholder 
litigation and a loss in shareholder wealth, as expected. However, across all event 
estimation windows, the CARs are higher (less negative) for lobbying firms. CARs 
are 0.9 percent higher for lobbying firms for the [0,+1] interval and 2.64 percent 
higher for the [-3,+3] interval surrounding the litigation announcement. Moreover, 
the differences in CARs between lobbying and non-lobbying firms are statistically 
significant at the one percent level for all event estimation windows. The results 
presented in Table 6 confirm the benefits of lobbying in the form of reduced 
litigation costs, and we link the benefits of lobbying to improved shareholder wealth 
surrounding litigation announcements. 
In Figure 2, we extend the CAR estimation window to 40 days surrounding the 
litigation announcement and compare the CARs of lobbying and non-lobbying firms. 
The figure shows that the adverse effect on the CARs of litigation announcements is 
more profound for the sample of non-lobbying firms, especially for the period 
leading up to the announcement. In addition, the CAR of non-lobbyiing firms 
remains negative for up to 40 days following litigation announcements. On the 
other hand, the CAR of financial firms that engage in lobbying activity are actually 
positive. The results presented in Figure 2 support the idea that the legal benefits 
achieved through corporate lobbying lead to improvements in firm value.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
We also test whether corporate lobbying has a long-term effect on financial firm 
value by calculating buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for the 12, 24, and 36 
month periods following lobbying activity. We test Hypothesis H.6 by estimating 
Equation (6). The dependent variables are the BHARs, and results are presented in 
Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The results reported in Table 7 show that lobbying activities, measured by a 
lobbying dummy variable and the log transform of lobbying expenditures, have a 
positive impact on the BHARs of financial firms for up to a period of 36 months 
after the lobbying activity. The results showing a longer-term positive impact of 
lobbying on financial firm stock returns are significant at the 1 percent level. 
In a further analysis, we attempt to isolate the impact of lobbying and lawsuits on 
firm value. We estimate the impact of lobbying (Lobbydum), shareholder lawsuits 
(Lawsuit), and the interaction of lobbying firms involved in lawsuits 
(Lobby*Lawsuit) on the 12, 24, and 36 month BHARs of financial firms. Results are 
presented in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The results presented in Table 8 show that lawsuits negatively impact the returns 
of financial firms, because Lawsuit is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, 
as expected. However, lobbying, all else equal, tends to increase shareholder wealth, 
as Lobbydum is positive and significant. However, the interaction term 
representing lobbying firms subject to litigation, Lobby*Lawsuit, is insignificant, 
which means that lobbying firms that are facing shareholder lawsuits do not suffer 
from reduced firm value. Similar to previous findings, the results imply that the 
benefits of corporate lobbying can offset the loss in firm value normally associated 
with shareholder lawsuits. 
In a final analysis, we separate the sample of firms into lobbying firms and non-
lobbying firms and then examine how lawsuits affect the 12, 24, and 36 month 
BHARs for financial firms. Results are presented in Table 9. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
The results in Table 9 show that shareholder lawsuits reduce the BHARs of non-
lobbying financial firms, and these results are significant at the 1 percent level. On 
the other hand, the Lawsuit coefficient is insignificant for lobbying firms. Our 
results imply a statistically significant difference between the change in firm value 
as the result of a lawsuit between lobbying and non-lobbying firm. Lobbying firm 
are less affected by lawsuits, which is consistent with our previous results showing 
the benefits of lobbying activities for financial firms. 
To provide greater depth for our results, we test the effect of shareholder allegations 
on firms’ cash holding level to understand the additional benefit of lobbying. Arena 
and Julio (2015) document that lawsuits increase firm cash holding for anticipated 
future settlements. Since lobbying may influence both case outcomes and 
settlement amounts, we expect that lobbying financial institutions may adjust their 
cash holding level as a respond to litigations.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
In Table 10, we test the relation between lobbying and cash holding for our sample 
firms. In column (1), our dependent variable is cash holding measured by the book 
value of cash and short-term investments normalized by assets. In column (2), we 
measure net cash holding measured as the book value of cash and short-term 
investments divided by book value of assets less the book value of short-term 
investments. Our results are similar to Arena and Julio (2015) where lawsuit have 
a positive relationship with cash holding. However, interaction term of lobbying and 
lawsuit indicate that lobbying financial institutions do not exhibit any pattern in 
cash holdings once the firms are subjected to shareholder allegations. This may be 
due to the fact that a) lobbying changes policy proposals on behalf of firms’ 
interests, or b) lobbying influence settlement amounts which influence cash holding 
sensitivity. In this case, lobbying firms may gain benefit from political spending 
which ultimately protects their financing decisions. Therefore, it is instructive to 
compare and contrast the changes in cash holding for firms to understand the 
influence of lobbying on case outcome.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
In Table 11, we measure the relation between lobbying and marginal value of 
additional dollar of cash in our sample. We calculate ∆Cash which is the changes in 
cash holding from year t and t-1. 6 We interact the changes in cash holding with 
lobbying interaction term to understand the effect of financing decision on firm 
                                                            
6 Our results remain same when we calculate the changes in net cash holding.  
performance. Our results from Table 11 shows that changes in cash holding levels 
have insignificant coefficient for lobbying firms. The insignificant interaction term 
represents that stock performance of lobbying firms are not affected by the changes 
in cash holdings. This may be due to the reason of lobbying influence on settlement 
amounts. In other words, lobbying activity may change the settlement amounts, 
hence, lobbying financial institutions do not suffer from reduced firm performance.  
7. Robustness 
As a robustness check of the results previously reported, we create a “treatment 
group” of lobbying firms and a “control group” of non-lobbying firms using a 
propensity score matching methodology. We then analyze the difference that the 
lobbying treatment has on legal outcomes of financial firms. Results are presented 
in Table 12. 
Our propensity score matching results presented in Table 12 show that lobbying 
firms have a lower number of shareholder related lawsuits, have more cases 
dismissed, and face fewer settlements. In addition, lobbying firms pay significantly 
lower settlement amounts, and the average duration of shareholder-related legal 
actions is lower for lobbying firms, which may represent long-term benefits from 
corporate lobbying in the form of reduced legal risks and costs. The results of the 
propensity matching methodology are consistent with our previous results showing 
the reduced impact of shareholder lawsuits and increased firm value as the result of 
corporate lobbying for financial firms. 
8. Conclusion 
The topic of corporate political lobbying in the U.S. is an important issue that has 
grown in prominence due to changes in the U.S. political landscape, whereby 
corporate contributions have grown considerably into the billions of dollars in recent 
election cycles. In addition, the benefits received by corporations as a result of their 
increased political capital and influence has been documented in the literature. In 
fact, the literature reports potential increases in shareholder wealth achieved 
through the use of political capital and corporate lobbying expenditures, and this is 
particularly true in larger, more highly concentrated industries, such as the 
financial services industry. 
Accordingly, we examine the impact of corporate lobbying in the financial services 
industry as a mechanism for increasing firm value. Specifically, we look at 
shareholder class action litigation outcomes and determine whether or not lobbying 
firms are able to use political capital and influence to improve their expected legal 
outcomes in the context of these lawsuits. We collect firm-level data and 
information about 131 shareholder class action lawsuits for a sample of the 200 
largest financial firms from 2000 to 2013. We then analyze the relationship between 
firm lobbying activities, lawsuit likelihood and outcomes, and shareholder value. 
First, we utilize a logistic and panel data regression estimation methodology and 
show that financial firms that engage in lobbying activities are less likely to face 
shareholder lawsuits and face a lower total amount of shareholder-based lawsuits, 
compared to non-lobbying firms. In addition, lobbying activities appear to improve 
lawsuit outcomes as well. Increases in lobbying activities are shown to be 
significantly associated with a higher likelihood of lawsuit dismissal, lower 
settlement amounts, and shorter litigation periods, consistent with the benefits 
achieved through lobbying in the form of a more advantageous legal environment. 
Then, we link financial firm corporate lobbying to improved short and long run firm 
value. We utilize and event study methodology using litigation announcement dates 
to compute cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) over several estimation 
intervals for lobbying and non-lobbying firms. Financial firms that engage in 
lobbying activities yield CARs that are significantly higher than non-lobbying firms. 
In addition, lobbying firms achieve positive returns for estimation intervals greater 
than 15 days, while non-lobbying firms yield negative CARs, consistent with 
increases in firm value associated with corporate lobbying. In terms of long run firm 
value, we compute buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns (BHARs) for 12, 24, and 36 
month holding periods following lobbying activities. Results show that financial 
firm corporate lobbying activities are associated with increases in lobbying firm 
BHARs, consistent with long-run benefits from corporate lobbying. Finally, we link 
corporate lobbying, litigation outcome, and firm value by analyzing the interaction 
of lobbying firms subject to litigation. Results show that litigation is associated with 
a significant reduction in BHAR; however, firms that are subject to litigation, but 
also engage in lobbying, see no change in BHAR, which is consistent with increases 
in long run firm value achieved due to improvements in the firm’s legal 
environment brought about through the acquisition of political capital in the form of 
lobbying. 
Our results add to the corporate finance literature on the short and long term 
benefits of corporate lobbying. We show that lobbying can add value, particularly in 
the context of highly regulated industries, such as the financial services industry. In 
addition, we show that corporate lobbying can benefit the firm through 
improvements in shareholder class action litigation outcomes brought about 
through political influence. The results have interesting implications for financial 
firm governance by showing the potential benefits of corporate lobbying, but also for 
regulators and policymakers concerned with the increasing influence of corporate 
interests in the U.S. political system. 
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Table 1 
      Summary Statistics             
  #N Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
Panel A. Lobby Characteristics 
      Lobbydum   2,579  0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Lobby Expenses   2,579  315,177.60 0.00 1,086,885.00 0.00 10,200,000.00 
Lobby Bill   2,579  2.52 0.00 11.52 0.00 232.00 
       Panel B. Litigation Characteristics       Litigation   2,579  0.04 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Dismiss   2,579  0.02 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Settle   2,579  0.02 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Settle Amount   2,579  826,466.40 0.00 11,500,000.00 0.00 375,000,000.00 
Duration   2,579  26.17 0.00 226.91 0.00 3,666.00 
       Panel C. Firm Characteristics       Ln(Assets)   2,579  9.21 9.09 1.93 0.18 14.99 
Tobin's Q   2,579  1.40 1.10 1.09 0.61 16.79 
BookLeverage   2,579  0.29 0.20 0.25 0.00 1.67 
ROA   2,579  0.03 0.01 0.07 -1.74 0.89 
HerfindahlIndex   2,579  0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.53 
SalesGrowth   2,579  0.18 0.00 1.98 -0.99 92.60 
Ln(FirmAge)   2,579  2.85 2.89 0.70 0.00 4.14 
              
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample (2000-2013), reporting the full sample summary statistics for measures of lobbying variables, and control 
variables. Panel A summarizes information of lobbying characteristics of firms used in this study. Panel B lists calculated summary statistics of litigation 
characteristics. Panel C lists calculated summary statistics of control variables.  
Table 2 
Lobbying and Likelihood of Shareholder Litigation 
Dependent Variable       
Sample  Lawsuitt+1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbydumt -0.595 
   [0.001]*** 
  Ln(LobbyExpense)t 
 
-0.047 
   
[0.001]*** 
 Ln(TotalBills)t 
  
-0.192 
   
[0.001]*** 
Ln(Assets)t 0.907 0.923 0.910 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Tobin's Qt 0.305 0.307 0.304 
 [0.062]* [0.060]* [0.063]* 
BookLeveraget -1.178 -1.204 -1.191 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
ROAt 5.465 5.609 5.625 
 [0.388] [0.376] [0.371] 
HerfindahlIndext 10.140 10.232 10.014 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
SalesGrowtht -0.072 -0.079 -0.071 
 [0.571] [0.548] [0.577] 
Ln(FirmAge)t -0.013 -0.024 -0.024 
 [0.946] [0.897] [0.896] 
Constant -13.744 -13.890 -13.780 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Year/Firm Fixed  YES YES YES 
N 2,499 2,499 2,499 
R2 30% 30% 30% 
Table 2 exhibits the relationship between lawsuit risk and lobbying 
characteristics between 2000 and 2013. The dependent variable lawsuit 
is binary variable and equal to one if firm is facing shareholder 
litigation, zero otherwise. Lobbydum is a binary variable and equal to 
one if firm lobbied at least one bill, zero otherwise. Ln(totalbills) are the 
log transformation of total bills sponsored. Ln(LobbyExpense) is the 
total lobbying expenses in given year. Other control variables are 
calculated from COMPUSTAT. Std. Errors are clustered at firm level for 
robustness check. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Table 3 
Lobbying and Total Number of Litigation 
Dependent Variable       
Sample  Ln(Lawsuit)t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbydumt -0.033 
   [0.001]*** 
  Ln(LobbyExpense)t 
 
-0.003 
   
[0.001]*** 
 Ln(TotalBills)t 
  
-0.001 
   
[0.001]*** 
Ln(Assets)t 0.030 0.030 0.030 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Tobin's Qt 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 [0.112] [0.116] [0.094] 
BookLeveraget -0.029 -0.028 -0.029 
 [0.484] [0.486] [0.484] 
ROAt -0.060 -0.059 -0.062 
 [0.407] [0.411] [0.391] 
HerfindahlIndext -0.142 -0.136 -0.167 
 [0.467] [0.485] [0.391] 
SalesGrowtht -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.464] [0.471] [0.486] 
Ln(FirmAge)t -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 
 [0.392] [0.388] [0.416] 
Constant -0.180 -0.180 -0.186 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Year/Firm Fixed  YES YES YES 
N 2,499 2,499 2,499 
R2 28% 30% 30% 
Table 3 exhibits the relationship between total number of lawsuit 
and lobbying characteristics between 2000 and 2013. The dependent 
variable is the log transformation of total number of lobbying filed 
against the firms. Lobbydum is a binary variable and equal to one if 
firm lobbied at least one bill, zero otherwise. Ln(totalbills) are the 
log transformation of total bills sponsored. Ln(LobbyExpense) is the 
total lobbying expenses in given year. Other control variables are 
calculated from COMPUSTAT. Std. Errors are clustered at firm 
level for robustness check. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Table 4 
   Lobbying and Litigation Outcome 
   Dependent Variable             
Sample  Dismisst+1 Settlet+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lobbydumt 1.021 
  
-0.329 
   [0.001]*** 
  
[0.001]*** 
  Ln(LobbyExpense)t 
 
0.066 
  
-0.031 
   
[0.001]*** 
  
[0.001]*** 
 Ln(TotalBills)t 
  
0.184 
  
-0.184 
   
[0.001]*** 
  
[0.001]*** 
Ln(Assets)t 0.737 0.736 0.681 0.238 0.350 0.681 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Tobin's Qt 0.224 0.225 0.225 0.072 0.107 0.225 
 [0.139] [0.135] [0.123] [0.044]** [0.064]* [0.123] 
BookLeveraget -1.291 -1.267 -1.107 -0.417 -0.604 -1.107 
 [0.089]* [0.094]* [0.122] [0.028]** [0.044]** [0.122] 
ROAt 5.637 5.635 5.257 1.818 2.683 5.257 
 [0.361] [0.358] [0.384] [0.116] [0.170] [0.384] 
HerfindahlIndext 6.318 6.253 5.685 2.038 2.977 5.685 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
SalesGrowtht -0.483 -0.482 -0.432 -0.156 -0.229 -0.432 
 [0.402] [0.401] [0.453] [0.129] [0.190] [0.453] 
Ln(FirmAge)t 0.222 0.219 0.248 0.071 0.104 0.248 
 [0.364] [0.370] [0.313] [0.117] [0.176] [0.313] 
Constant -12.735 -12.726 -12.326 -4.108 -6.060 -12.326 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Year/Firm Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
R2 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 
Table 4 exhibits the relationship between lawsuit outcome and lobbying characteristics between 2000 
and 2013. From column 1 to 3, dependent variable is a binary variable of dismiss equal to one if 
litigation is dismissed, zero otherwise. From column 4 to 6, dependent variable is a binary variable of 
settle and equal to one if the case is settled between parties, zero otherwise. Other control variables are 
calculated from COMPUSTAT. Std. Errors are clustered at firm level for robustness check. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Table 5 
   Lobbying and Litigation Characteristics 
   Dependent 
Variable             
Sample  Ln(Settle Amount)t+1  Ln(Duration)t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lobbydumt -0.742 
  
-0.361 
  
 
[0.001]**
* 
  
[0.001]**
* 
  Ln(LobbyExpense)t 
 
-0.055 
  
-0.026 
 
 
 
[0.001]**
* 
  
[0.001]**
* 
 Ln(TotalBills)t 
  
-0.202 
  
-0.068 
 
  
[0.001]**
* 
  
[0.001]*** 
Ln(Assets)t 0.250 0.247 0.243 0.259 0.258 0.258 
 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* [0.001]*** 
Tobin's Qt 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.045 0.045 0.048 
 [0.858] [0.868] [0.727] [0.098]* [0.100] [0.085]* 
BookLeveraget -0.174 -0.171 -0.170 -0.162 -0.161 -0.161 
 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* [0.001]*** 
ROAt -0.660 -0.657 -0.643 -0.561 -0.561 -0.563 
 [0.194] [0.193] [0.201] [0.298] [0.302] [0.308] 
HerfindahlIndext 0.343 0.366 0.101 -1.263 -1.265 -1.434 
 [0.777] [0.764] [0.940] [0.402] [0.404] [0.383] 
SalesGrowtht -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
 [0.234] [0.296] [0.333] 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* [0.001]*** 
Ln(FirmAge)t 0.005 0.006 0.002 -0.257 -0.256 -0.255 
 [0.980] [0.977] [0.994] [0.268] [0.272] [0.265] 
Constant -2.084 -2.064 -2.035 -1.465 -1.458 -1.460 
 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* 
[0.001]**
* [0.001]*** 
Year/Firm Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
R2 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 
Table 5 exhibits the relationship total number of case outcome and lobbying characteristics between 
2000 and 2013. From column 1 to 3, dependent variable is the log transformation of total number of 
dismissed cases. From column 4 to 6, dependent variable is the total number of settled cases. Other 
control variables are calculated from COMPUSTAT. Std. Errors are clustered at firm level for robustness 
check. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 6 
      Event Study CARs           
Days #Lobby CAR #NonLobby CAR Diff T-Test 
[0,+1] 50 -0.61% 81 -1.51% -0.90% [-3.45]*** 
[0,+2] 50 -0.31% 81 -1.88% -1.57% [-2.95]*** 
[0,+3] 50 -0.74% 81 -2.07% -1.33% [-4.15]*** 
[-1,+1] 50 -0.38% 81 -1.78% -1.40% [-3.33]*** 
[-1,+2] 50 -0.43% 81 -1.45% -1.02% [-4.05]*** 
[-2,+2] 50 -0.85% 81 -2.31% -1.46% [-3.48]*** 
[-3,+3] 50 -0.56% 81 -3.20% -2.64% [-3.39]*** 
              
 Table 6 reports market responses to shareholder litigation announcement effect of the 
lobbying and the non-lobbying sub-samples. #Lobby is the number of lobbyist firm in our 
sample who are subjected to litigation announcement. #NonLobby is the number of non-
lobbying firm in our sample with litigation announcement. CAPM model is used to 
calculated CARs of event windows.  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑀𝑀�𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
Where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the actual return and 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 is the return of a selected market index (CRSP 
value weight index).   
 
 
Table 7 
   Lobbying and Firm Performance 
   Dependent Variable             
Sample BHARt+1 BHARt+2 BHARt+3 BHARt+1 BHARt+2 BHARt+3 
  (1) (2) (3) (2) (3) (4) 
Lobbydumt 0.072 0.166 0.241 
    [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
   Ln(LobbyExpense)t 
   
0.005 0.012 0.018 
    
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Ln(Assets)t -0.023 -0.081 -0.125 -0.024 -0.083 -0.128 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Tobin's Qt 0.027 0.016 -0.047 0.027 0.015 -0.048 
 [0.194] [0.483] [0.070]** [0.197] [0.500] [0.065]* 
BookLeveraget 0.041 0.006 0.030 0.041 0.006 0.029 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
ROAt 0.471 -0.415 0.258 0.471 -0.421 0.249 
 [0.129] [0.206] [0.638] [0.130] [0.202] [0.651] 
HerfindahlIndext -0.285 0.062 -0.071 -0.286 0.049 -0.091 
 [0.076]* [0.811] [0.854] [0.075]* [0.848] [0.813] 
SalesGrowtht -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 [0.109] [0.499] [0.728] [0.109] [0.502] [0.727] 
Ln(FirmAge)t -0.038 -0.068 -0.108 -0.038 -0.067 -0.106 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant 0.662 1.558 2.365 0.664 1.572 2.386 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Year/Firm Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2,450 2,439 2,428 2,450 2,439 2,428 
R2 22% 30% 30% 22% 30% 30% 
Table 7 exhibits the relationship between long term buy-and-hold abnormal returns and lobbying 
indicators between 2000 and 2013.  We calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns for +12, +24 and +36 
months after lobbying activity. Other control variables are calculated from COMPUSTAT. Std. Errors 
are clustered at firm level for robustness check. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 8 
Lobbying, Litigation Firm Performance 
Dependent Variable       
Sample BHARt+1 BHARt+2 BHARt+3 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbydumt 0.066 0.157 0.237 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Lobby*Lawsuitt 0.046 0.079 0.026 
 0.547 0.420 0.823 
Lawsuitt -0.174 -0.150 -0.138 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Ln(Assets)t -0.017 -0.076 -0.120 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Tobin's Qt 0.030 0.018 -0.045 
 [0.156] [0.426] [0.088]* 
BookLeveraget 0.044 0.007 0.032 
 [0.140] [0.893] [0.708] 
ROAt 0.467 -0.415 0.259 
 [0.126] [0.207] [0.636] 
HerfindahlIndext -0.211 0.126 -0.015 
 [0.182] [0.638] [0.970] 
SalesGrowtht -0.003 -0.001 0.002 
 [0.093]* [0.461] [0.742] 
Ln(FirmAge)t -0.040 -0.070 -0.110 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Constant 0.605 1.512 2.318 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Year/Firm Fixed  YES YES YES 
N 2,450 2,439 2,428 
R2 22% 30% 30% 
Table 8 exhibits the relationship between long term buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns, lawsuits and lobbying indicators between 2000 and 
2013.  We calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns for +12, +24 and 
+36 months after lobbying activity. An interaction variable of lawsuit 
variable multiplied by lawsuit variable is added to columns. Other 
control variables are calculated from COMPUSTAT. Std. Errors are 
clustered at firm level for robustness check. Numbers in parentheses 
are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 9 
   Litigation and Stock Returns 
   Dependent Variable Lobby NonLobby 
Sample BHARt+1 BHARt+2 BHARt+3 BHARt+1 BHARt+2 BHARt+3 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Lawsuitt -0.131 0.153 -0.129 -0.144 -0.190 -0.111 
 [0.344] [0.311] [0.451] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       BHARt+1 LawsuitLobby=LawsuitNonLobby chi(2):4.32 Prob>Chi2 : 0.01 
 BHARt+2 LawsuitLobby=LawsuitNonLobby chi(2):5.22 Prob>Chi2 : 0.01 
 BHARt+3 LawsuitLobby=LawsuitNonLobby chi(2):4.71 Prob>Chi2 : 0.01 
               
Year/Firm Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 333 323 307 2,246 2,141 2,108 
R2 11% 9% 5% 22% 30% 30% 
Table 9 exhibits the relationship between long term buy-and-hold abnormal returns and lawsuit risk 
between 2000 and 2013.  We calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns for +12, +24 and +36 months 
after lobbying activity. We test the coefficients from three different regressions and report the chi-
square stats. Other control variables are calculated from COMPUSTAT. Std. Errors are clustered at 
firm level for robustness check. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 
 
 
Table 10 
Lobbying, Litigation and Cash Holding 
Dependent Variable     
Sample Cash Holdingt+1 Net Cash Holdingt+1 
  (1) (2) 
Lobbydumt 0.013 0.016 
 [0.808] [0.845] Lobby*Lawsuitt 0.006 0.008 
 [0.339] [0.460] Lawsuitt 0.036 0.052 
 [0.012]** [0.017]** Ln(Assets)t 0.009 0.011 
 [0.032]** [0.067]* Tobin's Qt 0.023 0.041 
 [0.110] [0.080]* BookLeveraget -0.039 -0.054 
 [0.043]* [0.065]* ROAt 0.390 0.603 
 [0.075]* [0.092]* HerfindahlIndext 0.398 0.543 
 [0.047]** [0.078]* SalesGrowtht -0.002 -0.004 
 [0.520] [0.401] Ln(FirmAge)t 0.002 -0.002 
 [0.758] [0.853] Constant -0.064 -0.089 
 
[0.111] [0.152] 
Year/Firm Fixed  YES YES 
N 2,450 2,450 
R2 22% 30% 
Table 10 exhibits the relationship between cash holding and lobbying between 2000 
and 2013. In column (1), our dependent variable is cash holding measured by the 
book value of cash and short term investments normalized by assets. In column (2), 
our dependent variable is net cash holdings measured by book value of cash and 
short-term investments divided by book value of assets less the book value of cash 
and short-term investments. Other control variables are calculated from 
COMPUSTAT. Std. Errors are clustered at firm level for robustness check. 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Table 11 
Lobbying, Cash Holding and Stock Performance 
Dependent Variable       
Sample BHARt+1 BHARt+2 BHARt+3 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Lobbydumt 0.103 0.160 0.158 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.010]** Lobby*∆CashHoldingt -0.277 -0.202 0.095 
 [0.142] [0.494] [0.833] 
∆CashHoldingt 0.207 0.537 0.688 
 [0.107] [0.001]*** [0.026]** Ln(Assets)t -0.015 -0.042 -0.063 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** Tobin's Qt -0.012 -0.051 -0.070 
 [0.788] [0.441] [0.508] BookLeveraget 0.073 0.061 0.094 
 [0.014]** [0.299] [0.291] ROAt 2.494 2.274 3.136 
 [0.001]*** [0.016]** [0.001]*** HerfindahlIndext -0.518 -0.404 -0.167 
 [0.001]*** [0.197] [0.749] SalesGrowtht 0.016 0.062 0.008 
 [0.253] [0.011]** [0.780] Ln(FirmAge)t -0.040 -0.050 -0.076 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.017]** Constant 0.683 1.104 1.548 
 
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Year/Firm Fixed  YES YES YES 
N 2,450 2,439 2,428 
R2 22% 30% 30% 
Table 11 exhibits the relationship between long term buy-and-hold abnormal returns, 
lawsuits and cash sensitivity between 2000 and 2013.  We calculate buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns for +12, +24 and +36 months after lobbying activity. An interaction variable of 
lawsuit variable multiplied by change in cash holding is added to columns. Other control 
variables are calculated from COMPUSTAT. Std. Errors are clustered at firm level for 
robustness check. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 12 
      Propensity Matching           
  
Treatment 
 
Control 
    #N Lobby #N NonLobby Diff T-Stat 
       Lawsuit 274 0.011 1,473 0.082 -0.071 [-6.15]*** 
       
       Dismiss 274 0.081 1,473 0.032 0.049 [3.78]*** 
       
       Settle 274 0.023 1,473 0.051 -0.028 [-5.21]*** 
       
       Settle Amount 274   952,372.26  1,473   4,356,411.77  -3,404,039.51 [-4.35]*** 
       
       Duration 274 108.01 1,473 225.23 -117.22 [-3.68]*** 
              
Table 12 is propensity score matching test between treatment group (lobbying firms) and 
control group (non-lobbying firms).  Numbers in parentheses are p-values. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Number of Shareholder Litigation by Years 
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Figure 2 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Litigation Announcement by SEC 
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